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APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF
I.

INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal from the dismissal of plaintiff, American Estate Management

Corporation's ("American Estate"), complaint as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. American
Estate seeks a decree quieting title to a parking area of the Highland Terrace Apartments against
International Investment and Development Corporation ("IID") based on adverse possession.
Amended Complaint, R. 13-16, Addendum Ex. 10.l
In a prior action (the "Soldier Summit Litigation"), American Estate and Po-Cheng Chang
and Beatrice Chang (The "Changs") sought dissolution of various partnerships the Changs were
involved in with Ming-Cheng Lin and Hsuin Mei Yen Lin (The "Lins"). Soldier Summit
Complaint, R.32-41, Addendum Ex. 5. The defendant in this case, IID, was not initially a party
to the Soldier Summit action. Id. In September of 1995, however, the Changs and American
Estate amended the Soldier Summit Complaint, naming IID as a party. Amended Soldier Summit
Complaint, R.46-65, Addendum Ex. 6. The Amended Soldier Summit Complaint included claims
for breach of a Separation Agreement between the Lins and the Changs and for specific
performance of that agreement. Id. (Counts 5 & 9).
Pursuant to the terms of the Separation Agreement, the Lins were to cause IID to transfer
certain property to American Estate, including "improved real property known as the Highland
Terrace Apartment Complex, Salt Lake City, Utah." Separation Agreement, at f 10, Addendum
Ex. 2. Although the land containing the apartment building itself was transferred, the separate
parcel on which the parking lot is located was omitted from the legal description. The Separation
Agreement was entered into between the Lins and the Changs and neither American Estate nor IID

*A11 references to "Addendum Ex." refer to the addendum exhibits filed with Appellant's
opening brief.

is a party to that agreement. Id. Thus, the claims asserted against IID for breach and specific
performance of the Separation Agreement could were based on a theory of alter ego.
In Soldier Summit, the Lins and IID brought a Motion for Summary Judgment alleging
that the Changs had waived their claims for breach and specific performance by executing a
"Satisfaction of Debt" and that IID could not be liable because it was not a party to the Separation
Agreement. On February 26, 1997, Judge Glen K. Iwasaki issued a memorandum decision
granting in part and denying in part the Lins and IID's motion. Memorandum Decision, R.66-72,
Addendum Ex. 8. Judge Iwasaki agreed that the Satisfaction of Debt created an accord and
satisfaction, KL at p. 70, but denied the Lins1 motion with respect to the alter ego claims. Jd. at
p. 68. On August 13, 1997, the Soldier Summit Court issued a Final Order, reducing its prior
decision to judgment and dismissing other unresolved issues. Final Order, R.73-80 at 74,
Addendum Ex. 9. An appeal of the Soldier Summit decision is pending.
H.

ARGUMENT
A.

The Current Action is Not Barred by Either Claim or Issue
Preclusion Because there was No Final Judgment On the Merits.

In its Opposition Brief, IID argues that the current action is barred under the claim
preclusion prong of res judicata. Brief of Appellees, at pp. 8-14 ("Opp. Brief"). Claim preclusion
cannot apply, however, for the simple reason that there was not a final judgment "on the merits"
in the prior litigation. Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988).
The only claims in the Soldier Summit litigation which IID asserts relate to the ownership
of the Highland Terrace parking lot are the claims for specific performance and breach of the
Separation Agreement. Opp. Brief, at 9-10. IID contends that the Memorandum Decision issued
by the Soldier Summit Court held that these claims were "barred by the parties' Satisfaction of
-2-

Debt agreement of March 1, 1982" and subsequently incorporated into Judge Iwasaki's Final
Order. Opp. Brief at p. 25. IID's analysis, however, cannot withstand a careful reading of the
Soldier Summit Memorandum Decision and Final Order.
The Amended Soldier Summit Complaint alleged breach of the Separation Agreement and
sought Specific Performance of that Agreement against both the Lins and IID. Amended Soldier
Summit Complaint, R.46-65, Addendum Ex. 6. The Separation Agreement, however, was entered
into only by the Lins and the Changs. R. 122-27, Addendum Ex. 2. In reliance on that fact, the
Lins sought summary judgment on the grounds that IID had no involvement in the Separation
Agreement. Memorandum Decision, R.66-72 at p. 68, Addendum Ex. 8. In response, the
Changs argued that IID was liable as an alter ego of the Lins. Jd. Judge Iwasaki specifically
denied summary judgment as to the claims against IID as the alter ego of the Lins, stating:
A.

Alter Ego
Defendants [The Lins and IID] contend that certain defendants
should be dismissed from certain claims because those defendants were not
involved in those claims. Plaintiffs [The Changs and American Estate]
respond that all of the defendants should remain in the case on all claims
because they are all alter egos of each other. After examining the evidence
on this issue, the Court concludes that there is sufficient evidence in this
case from which afinderof fact could conclude that the defendants are the
alter egos of one another. Thus the Court denies defendants1 motion
insofar as it seeks dismissal of certain claims against certain defendants
on this basis, including claim 1 (Dissolution of Soldier Summit), claim 3
(Accounting Re: Soldier Summit), claim 4 (Negligent Misrepresentation),
claim 5 (Breach of Separation Agreement), claim 6 (Breach of
Consulting Agreement), claim 7 (Breach of Partnership Agreement), claim
8 (Fraud and Misrepresentation), and claim 9 (Specific Performance).

Memorandum Decision, R.66-72 at p. 68 (emphasis added), Addendum Ex. 8.
When the Soldier Summit Court issued its subsequent Final Order, these claims against
IID remained unresolved. Final Order, R.73-79, Addendum Ex. 9. Judge Iwasaki explains that

-3-

"The Court's Memorandum Decision of February 26, 1997, is hereby adopted and incorporated
into this Final Order by this reference with the following clarification." Id. at p. 77.2 The Final
Order then concludes, as follows:
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby orders, adjudges and decrees that
plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendants' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment be and hereby are granted in part and denied in part,
as set forth above in the Memorandum Decision. Plaintiffs' claims for dissolution
and an accounting of Soldier Summit are hereby granted in accordance with the
terms set forth above. Each of Defendants1 claims for conversion of Homestead
funds are dismissed with prejudice. All claims of the parties set forth in their
pleadings not reduced to summary judgment herein or otherwise dealt with
by this Order are hereby dismissed. This Order disposes of all issues raised by
the pleadings and will become final upon entry.
Final Order, R.73-79 at 79, Addendum Ex. 9 (emphasis added).
In the language quoted above, the Soldier Summit Court incorporated the prior
Memorandum Decision. It next dismissed the claims for conversion, indicating specifically that
those claims are to be dismissed "with prejudice." The Court then simply dismissed all remaining
unresolved claims, stating: "All claims of the parties set forth in their pleadings not reduced to
summary judgment herein or otherwise dealt with by this Order are hereby dismissed."
The difference in the treatment of the conversion claims and the other claims remaining
after summary judgment is instructive. In the Court's background discussion, Judge Iwasaki
explained that "On March 10, 1997, the Defendants contacted the Court and indicated that they

2

The clarification did not modify the Memorandum Decision as it related to the denial of
summary judgment on the Fifth and Ninth claims of the Amended Soldier Summit Complaint
for breach and specific performance of the Separation Agreement under a theory of alter ego.
Id. at pp. 77-78.
-4-

were voluntarily dismissing with prejudice their [counterclaims regarding the conversion of
Homestead Associates funds." Final Order, R.73-79 at 74 (emphasis added). Thus, the voluntary
dismissal of the conversion claim was done with prejudice and the Court so indicated in its order.
The claims for breach and specific performance against IID were not reduced to summary
judgement. Instead, those claims, identified by count number and description, were specifically
reserved by the Soldier Summit Court. Memorandum Decision, R.66-72 at p. 68, Addendum Ex.
8 ("Thus the Court denies defendants' motion insofar as it seeks dismissal of certain claims against
certain defendants on this basis [alter ego], including . . . claim 5 (Breach of Separation
Agreement), . . . and claim 9 (Specific Performance)."). As a result, the Soldier Summit Court
did not enter summary judgment in favor of IID on Counts 5 and 9. Moreover, the Final Order
does not address or discuss these counts. Final Order, R.73-79. Therefore, these claims were
encompassed in the Soldier Summit Court's general dismissal of remaining claims. These counts
could be dismissed because, as Judge Iwasaki indicated in his findings, "The parties moved for
summary judgment as to some of the claims, and made certain stipulations and dismissals
regarding the remaining claims." JcL at p. 75, f 1(C). The alter ego claims were not part of the
summary judgment and therefore were necessarily disposed of by virtue of the "certain stipulations
and dismissals" of the parties. Thus, the dismissal of these remaining claims was voluntary.
Unlike the conversion claims, the court does not specify that the dismissal is "with prejudice."
Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that when a claim is voluntarily
dismissed by order of the Court, the dismissal is without prejudice unless otherwise specified in
the order. U.R.CIV.P., 41(a)(2).
Under Rule 41(a), a plaintiff may dismiss by notice before service of an answer
or motion for summary judgment or by a stipulation signed by all parties. Such
dismissals are without prejudice unless the notice or stipulation states otherwise,
-5-

and except that a second voluntary dismissal operates as an adjudication on the
merits. In addition, a plaintiff may secure dismissal upon order of the court;
such dismissals too are without prejudice unless otherwise specified in the
order.
C.

WRIGHT

& A.

MILLER,

added; footnotes omitted)

18 FEDERAL
("WRIGHT

PRACTICE

& PROCEDURE, § 4435 at p. 331 (emphasis

& MILLER"). The conversion claim was dismissed with

prejudice because Judge Iwasaki made a specific notation to that effect in the Order. In contrast,
the claims remaining after summary judgment and not dealt with in the order were simply
"dismissed," which under the plain language of Rule 41 resulted in a dismissal without prejudice.
In arguing that the Soldier Summit Final Order bars the current action, IID confuses the
concepts of finality and "on the merits." Opp. Brief, at p. 26 n.4. Contrary to IID's assertion,
a finding that some claims were dismissed without prejudice would not affect the finality of the
trial court's ruling on other issues for purposes of appealability. "[I]t is clear that definitions of
finality cannot automatically be carried over from appeals cases to preclusion problems." 18
WRIGHT

& MILLER, § 4432 at p. 299 (footnote omitted). For a judgment to be final, "it is not

necessary that the rights and liabilities of a party or the claim be decided on the merits." 10
WRIGHT

& MILLER, § 2656 at p. 53 . Finality for purposes of appeal is concerned with whether

all of the issues pending before the trial court have been resolved. 10 WRIGHT & MILLER, § 2656
at p. 54 ("A 'final decision' is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for
the court to do but execute the judgment.")
So long as there is no more litigation on the merits pending before the trial court, it does
not matter how those issues were resolved. A partial summary judgment can be rendered "final"
for purposes of appeal, if the remaining claims are subsequently dismissed without prejudice.
E.g.. Chrysler Motors v. Thomas. 939 F.2d 538, 540 (8th Or. 1991): Scarbrough v. Perez. 870
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F.2d 1079, 1082 (6th Cir. 1989); Hanlan v. Mitchelson. 794 F.2d 834, 837 (2nd Cir. 1986);
Johnston v. Cartwright. 355 F.2d 32, 38 (8th Cir. 1966). The appellate court simply requires that
everything to be decided by the trial court in that action be resolved in a single appellate
proceeding. If the parties agree that certain claims can be dismissed, without prejudice, it means
that those claims will not be resolved in that action but can be brought in a separate proceeding.
9 WRIGHT & MILLER, § 2367 p. 318 ("If the court's order is silent on this point, the dismissal is
without prejudice, which means that it permits the initiation of a second action.") In contrast, a
decision "with prejudice" means that it has been decided on the merits and is binding for purposes
of res judicata. Id. at pp. 318-19.
In Soldier Summit, the court was silent on the dismissal of the alter ego claims, including
those for breach and specific performance of the Separation Agreement. Therefore, those claims
were not dismissed "on the merits" and a subsequent proceeding was not barred.
B.

Because the Claim in the Soldier Summit Litigation Was Not
the Same as that Raised in the Pending Litigation, the Issue
Preclusion Prong of Res Judicata is Applicable to this Analysis.

As has been discussed above, the Soldier Summit Final Order has no preclusive effect
because the claims against IID for breach and specific performance of the Separation Agreement
were dismissed without prejudice. Even if that were not the case, the analysis of whether the
current action should be barred is governed by the issue preclusion branch of res judicata.
Despite IID's assertions to the contrary, Opp. Brief, at 15, American Estate raised this
issue before the trial court, arguing the exact language of Schaer v. Department of Transportation,
657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983), that it asserts as authority for its position before this Court.
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, R.172186 at 182. At that time, American Estate argued: "Defendants cannot establish the elements of
-7-

res judicata here because (1) plaintiff's adverse possession claim is not the same cause of action
as at issue in the Soldier Summit Action, and (2) there was not a final judgment on the merits
quieting title to the subject property." Id. at 180 (emphasis added). IID's assertion that Judge
Frederick based his dismissal on claim preclusion, Opp. Brief, at 15, does not limit this court's
ability to apply correctly the proper prong of res judicata. A trial court's decisions of law are
accorded no particular deference and must be reviewed for correctness. Harline v. Baker. 912
P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996).
To determine whether issue or claim preclusion controls, the court must decide if the claim
in the first action was the same as the claim in the pending action. Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme,
Inc.. 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983). If the claims are the same, claim preclusion is applicable;
If the claims are different, only those issues that were fully and fairly litigated are barred from
reconsideration. Penrod. 669 P.2d at 875. The claims raised in the Soldier Summit litigation are
clearly not the same as those raised here.
The claims against IID in the Soldier Summit litigation that it relies upon as a bar to the
current adverse possession action were for breach and specific performance of a Separation
Agreement entered into between the Lins and the Changs. Those claims have nothing to do with
the adverse possession claim brought by American Estate against IID in the present action. The
differences between the claims here are significantly greater than the differences between claims
for implied and prescriptive easement addressed in Wheadon v. Pearson. 376 P.2d 946 (Utah
1962). The Wheadon Court held that claim preclusion applied only "where the claim, demand or
cause of action is the same in both cases." 376 P.2d at 947. It then applied the claim preclusion
test because: "Here, we have the same parties litigating the same subject matter-an asserted right
of way over defendants' property." Id. A similar conclusion cannot be reached here.
-8-

The gravamen of claim 5 and 9 of the Soldier Summit litigation was the intention of the
Lins and the Changs when they executed the Separation Agreement. Evidence of the negotiations
and intentions of the parties to that agreement would be critical in resolving that issue. The
present claim for adverse possession requires an examination of the activity of American Estate
on the property for each seven year period after it took actual possession of the Highland Terrace
parking lot. Unlike Wheadon, the claims in the two actions here are not the same.
DeBry v.Noble. 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995) is also inapposite. There, DeBry raised the
very same set of factual assertions in the second action as in the first. The only difference was that
Debry pled a breach of contract claim based on those facts in the first action and tort claims in the
second. 889 P.2d at 444. Accord. Belliston v. Texaco. Inc.. 521 P.2d 379, 381 (Utah 1974) ("In
the instant action, plaintiffs have, in effect conceded that their state and federal claims for unlawful
price discrimination arose from the same nucleus of operative facts.")3 In this case, the facts that
support each of the claims are necessarily different. The breach of contract claim in Soldier
Summit was based on the facts surrounding the execution of the Separation Agreement between
the Lins and the Changs. The subsequent open and notorious possession by American Estate was
not considered by or relevant to the Soldier Summit Court. Indeed, the facts surrounding the
execution of the Separation Agreement are irrelevant to the determination of whether American
Estate has satisfied the requirements of title by adverse possession. As a result, the claims are not
the same and a claim preclusion analysis is inapplicable.

3

IID also relies upon Bradshaw v. Kershaw. 627 P.2d 528 (Utah 1981), which has no
application here. The defendant failed to comply with a prior final order instructing him to
deliver a well permit. Only after he was charged with contempt for failure to comply, did the
defendant argue that conveyance was impossible. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the
contempt charges because the defense of impossibility was not raised in the prior action.
-9-

Decisions cited by IID are consistent with this conclusion. Lewis v. Matteo. 679 A.2d 366
(Conn. App. 1996), "adopted the trial court's well reasoned decision" evaluating defendants'
argument that plaintiff's adverse possession claim was barred by a prior final judgment. The prior
action was a deed-based quiet title claim. In considering whether the quiet title action barred the
pending adverse possession claim, the trial court relied on the fact that plaintiff had actually raised
adverse possession in the deed action. The Lewis Court explained:
The court has reviewed the record of the prior action exhaustively, however,
including the audiotape of the trial, and that record indicates that disputes
concerning adverse possession arose repeatedly.
679 A.2d at 428 (emphasis added). The Lewis Court also noted that the plaintiff inserted the
adverse possession argument into its post trial memorandum. Jd. In applying a transactional test
to determine whether the claims in each action were the same, the trial court could "not escape the
conclusion that the plaintiffs actually raised claims of adverse possession in that proceeding."
679 A.2d at 430 (emphasis added). The trial court held:
The court, therefore, finds that the plaintiffs actually raised their present claim
of adverse possession in the prior action. Under the doctrine of claim
preclusion, the plaintiff's cannot recover upon the same claim in the present
action.
679 A.2d at 431 (emphasis added).
The Lewis Court also considered the effect of the prior action assuming the adverse
possession claim had not been raised. It acknowledged that the "plaintiffs theory of title by deed
would, at first glance, appear to be based on a transaction, i.e., a conveyance, separate from the
plaintiffs' adverse possession theory." 679 A.2d at 432. Because the prior court had actually
decided issues concerning the plaintiffs' "use, possession, occupancy and control" over the
property, however, the court found that the facts actually considered would have supported an

-10-

adverse possession claim. Id. Accord. Aldape v. Akins. 668 P.2d 130, 136 (Idaho 1983) ("Both
the theory of accretion and the theory of adverse possession offered in Aldape I grew out of the
same central operative fact~the movement of the Boise River.")
Nothing in the Soldier Summit record could support an argument, and IID has not alleged,
that American Estate actually raised an adverse possession claim in the Soldier Summit
proceeding. Instead, the Soldier Summit litigation involved the dissolution and accounting of the
various partnerships that the Lins and the Changs held together.

Moreover, the breach of

Separation Agreement claim in Soldier Summit was dependent upon an entirely different set of
operative facts than American Estate's subsequent claim for adverse possession.
The Illinois Court of Appeals held consistently with American Estate's position in Riley
v. Singer. 394 N.E.2d 746 (111. App. 1979). Plaintiff filed a complaint to quiet title to certain real
property on the basis of a tax deed. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, finding against plaintiff on the title issue. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an appeal of the
quiet title action as well as a new complaint for quiet title on the basis of adverse possession. The
trial court in the second proceeding granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on the grounds of
res judicata. The Illinois Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prior tax deed action did not
involve the same claim as that raised in the adverse possession action. The Riley Court explained:
In this case the only issues determined in the prior action were the nullity of the
tax deed and the payment of back taxes, neither of which has an effect on the
subsequent action in adverse possession
It is clear that the mere fact that
the same relief is sought in two actions does not make the causes of action
identical within the doctrine of res judicata. 46 Am. Jur.2d Judgments, § 412.
"In the application of the doctrine of res judicata, if it is doubtful whether a second
action is for the same cause of action as the first, a test commonly applied is to
consider the identity of facts essential to their maintenance, or whether the
same evidence would sustain both. Under this test, if the same facts or evidence
would sustain both, the two actions are considered to be on the same cause of
action, within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to a subsequent
-11-

action; if, however, the two actions rest upon different states of facts, or if
different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a judgment in
one is no bar to the maintenance of the other. . . . " For the foregoing reasons
we hold that the court erred in dismissing with prejudice the plaintiff's complaint
394 N.E.2d at 750-51 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Newkirk v. Porter. 82 S.E.2d 74, (N.C. 1954), the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that a prior unsuccessful adverse possession claim did not bar plaintiff's deed claim
to the same property. The Newkirk Court relied on the different type of evidence necessary to
prove each claim, stating:
The plea of res judicata is without merit for the very simple reason that the
allegations, the evidence, and the merits of the present action are substantially
different from the allegations, the evidence and the merits of the former
action.
82 S.E.2d at 79 (citation omitted; emphasis added). See also. Flobert Industries. Inc. v. Stuhr.
343 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Neb. 1984) (Prior determination of possession of right of way did not bar
subsequent trespass action because issue of possession was only ancillary to claims before prior
court.); Nethers v. Nye. 293 N.E.2d 121, 125 (Ohio 1972) (Prior action in ejectment did not bar
subsequent quiet title claim because prior action did "not of necessity decide the question of
title.").
In Falconaero Enterprises. Inc. v. Valley Investment Co.. 395 P.2d 915 (Utah 1964), the
Utah Supreme Court held that res judicata did not bar the plaintiff's adverse possession claim.
Unfortunately, the Falconaero Court does not describe the nature of the prior action. The Utah
Supreme Court's opinion does indicate, however, that: "As to the claim plaintiff was barred by
res judicata, we think it to be without merit, if for no other reason than that plaintiff and its
privies perfected their title under the seven-year adverse possession statute." 395 P.2d at 916
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(emphasis added). The limited analysis available from the Falconaero court suggests that the proof
of the statutory requirements of adverse possession creates a unique body of evidence that is
reason enough for distinguishing it from other claims.
This result is consistent with the Supreme Court of Montana's decision in Baertsch v.
County of Lewis and Clark. 727 P.2d 504 (Mont. 1986). In Baertsch. a group of landowners
brought an action for writ of mandamus against the court seeking an order that the county abandon
its ownership claim to certain real property known as McHugh Drive. The action was concluded
in favor of the county and none of the property was abandoned. Almost immediately thereafter,
the landowners initiated another action alleging, among other theories, that they had acquired title
through adverse possession. The county asserted res judicata as a defense and the trial court
dismissed the complaint. The Montana Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that:
We conclude that the issues in the two cases are not the same. In [the first
action] the request of the landowners was for the vacation of a portion of McHugh
Drive under the statutory authority granted to the County Commissioners. The
title or ownership to the Drive was not in any manner involved in that
proceeding. In contrast, the essential claims in the present case are issues relating
to the title to the McHugh Drive roadway itself.
727 P.2d at 506 (emphasis added).4
Title or ownership of the Highland Terrace parking lot was not the subject of the Soldier
Summit litigation. Rather, that case was concerned with the winding up and accounting of the
Lins' and Changs' joint business ventures. The adverse possession claim brought by American
Estate instead concerns the issue of title to the parking lot of the Highland Terrace Apartments.
In an attempt to avoid the application of an issue preclusion analysis, IID argues that the
Utah Supreme Court case Schaer v. Department of Transporatation. 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983),
4

The Baertsch Court also concluded that the Board of Commissioners did not have the
authority to decide questions of title in the prior action. 727 P.2d at 506.
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should be ignored. Opp. Brief, pp. 15-19. Because the Schaer decision is well-reasoned and
controlling, that argument should be rejected.5 In Schaer. the Utah Department of Transportation
("UDOT") sought to condemn property owned by plaintiff. In setting the value of Schaer's
property, the district court rejected UDOT's argument that the Dug way Road could provide
adequate access. 675 P.2d at 1338. In subsequent litigation, UDOT sought to condemn additional
portions of Schaer ! s property.

Schaer now claimed that the Dug way Road was a highway

dedicated to the public use and that the property was suitable for residential development. UDOT
argued that Schaer was barred from asserting that position by res judicata. On appeal, the Utah
Supreme Court explained that res judicata [claim preclusion] applies only when the same claim has
been raised in both actions. 657 P.2d at 1340. That continues to be the rule in Utah today. E.g.,
DeBry. 889 P.2d at 444; Penrod. 669 P.2d at 875. The Schaer Court then addressed the proper
method for determining when the claims are the same. The Utah Supreme Court found that: "The
two causes of action rest on a different state of facts and evidence of a different kind or character
is necessary to sustain the two causes of action. Moreover, the evidence of the two causes of
action relates to the status of the property in two completely different and separate time periods."
If the Schaer test is applied to the facts of this case, the result is the same. The Soldier
Summit claims rested on different facts and evidence than the adverse possession claim in this
case.

Furthermore, the Soldier Summit case did not concern American Estate's title to the

property. Instead, it addressed the actions and intentions of the Lins and Changs in executing the
5

IID suggests that the Schaer decision "lacks current force because of the use of
terminology that is somewhat imprecise and outdated." Opp. Brief, at p. 16. Although the
Schaer Court does not refer to the prongs of res judicata as "issue preclusion" and "claim
preclusion," it applies the distinctions between those branches consistently with more recent
Utah pronouncements. Madsen. 769 P.2d at 250; Penrod. 669 P.2d at 875. Interestingly, IID
also relies upon Utah cases that do not use the issue and claim preclusion nomenclature. E.g..
Belliston. 521 P.2d at 382; Wheadon. 376 P.2d at 947.
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Separation Agreement. Because the claims are not the same, any argument that the current action
is barred must be supported by an analysis under the issue preclusion branch of res judicata.
Because IID knows it cannot prevail under such an analysis, it does not challenge American
Estate's assertion that the elements of issue preclusion are not met here. Opp. Brief, at p. 20 n. 1.
IID also tries to "beg the question" by suggestion that claim preclusion is applicable
because the Soldier Summit action could have included a claim for adverse possession. Opp.
Brief, at 17. That argument was soundly rejected in City of Santa Fe v. Velarde. 564 P.2d 1326
(N.M. 1977). The City brought a quiet title action to certain property. In response, Velarde
asserted that he had acquired title through adverse possession. The City moved for summary
judgment, claiming that the claim was barred by a prior action in which Velarde claimed
ownership under a federal statute providing that the City held the land in trust for persons claiming
title by "actual possession or under color of title for the period of ten years." 564 P.2d at 1327.
The prior action was dismissed with prejudice, with leave for Velarde to amend the complaint
within twenty days. Velarde did not amend the complaint. Based on that prior dismissal, the trial
court granted the City's motion for summary judgment finding that the adverse possession claim
could have been included by amendment. The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed, stating:
In our view, the fact that Velarde was given the opportunity to amend his
pleadings so as to change his cause of action is not the same as to say that the
causes of action were identical. The rule that a prior final decision determines
not only what was in issue but also what might have been put in issue
contemplates existing identical causes of action and not what the causes of
action might have been after theoretical amendments to the pleadings which
in fact were never made.
564 P.2d at 1328 (emphasis added).
The existing causes of action to be compared in determining which prong of res judicata
might be applicable are the claims for breach and specific performance of the Separation
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Agreement and the current claim for adverse possession. The proof of each is dependent upon a
separate nucleus of operative facts. Therefore, the claims are not the same and any res judicata
analysis must be undertaken pursuant to the issue preclusion branch of that doctrine. Because
ownership of the Highland Terrace parking lot was not fully and fairly litigated in the Soldier
Summit case, the present adverse possession claim is not barred.
C,

Even if Claim Preclusion did Apply and Even if There Had
Been a Prior Final Judgment on the Merits, the Adverse
Possession Claim Would Not be Barred Because it is Not a
Claim that Should Have Been Brought in the Prior Action.

American Estate did not assert an adverse possession claim when it filed the Soldier
Summit complaint because it was unaware that IID or the Lins were claiming any ownership
interest in that property. American Estate possessed the property and paid the taxes for thirteen
years without any idea that IID claimed any ownership interest. Affidavit of Beatrice Chang,
R. 116-120 at f 14, Addendum Ex. 1. American Estate reasonably concluded that its ownership
of the Highland Terrace Apartments included the parking lot.
IID argues that the assertion by American Estate that it did not know of IID's claimed
ownership to the Highland Terrace parking lot "finds no support in the record." Opp. Brief, at
p. 20. In fact, however, the record clearly supports this assertion. Beatrice Chang testified by
affidavit that:
13.
At no time prior to 1997 did International Investment give any
indication to me or to American Estate that it claimed any ownership
interest in the parking lot for the Highland Terrace Apartments.
*

*

*

17.
No claim was asserted in the original Complaint or the Second
Amended and Supplemental Complaint [in the Soldier Summit Action] to
quiet title to the subject property or to assert that adverse possession had
occurred. American Estate did not know that International investment
claimed any ownership interest in the Highland Terrace parking lot
when those complaints were filed. . . .
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Affidavit of Beatrice Chang, R. 116-120 at pp. 118 & 119 (emphasis added). IID's suggestion
that this evidence "lacks credibility," Opp. Brief, at p. 20, is misguided. A motion to dismiss is
only well taken where "the plaintiff or plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under the facts
alleged or under any state of facts they could prove to support their claim." Educators Mutual
Insurance Ass'n v. Allied Property and Casualty Insurance Co.. 890 P.2d 1029, 1030 (Utah
1995).

In determining whether to dismiss the claim, the court must "draw all reasonable

inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co.,
910 P.2d 1218, 1219 (Utah 1996). Thus, the district court was required to assume that American
Estate had no knowledge that IID claimed an interest in the parking lot until well after the Soldier
Summit action was pending. E ^ , Bolte v. AITS. Inc.. 587 P.2d 810, 814-15 (Haw. 1978).
In Bolte. the Hawaii Supreme Court held that a plaintiff is not barred from bringing a
claim it was unaware of at the time the original complaint was filed.
We adhere to the rule adopted by the majority of jurisdictions that have dealt with
the problem that a former recovery will not bar claims of which the plaintiff was
ignorant, even if those claims existed at the time suit was commenced in the
former recovery and could have been joined, unless plaintiffs ignorance was
due to his own negligence.
587 P.2d at 813-14 (emphasis added); See also. 18 WRIGHT & MILLER, § 4415 at p. 125 ("Claim
splitting may also be excused because the plaintiff did not know the full dimensions of the claim
at the time of the first action.").
Moreover, American Estate had no obligation to amend the pending Soldier Summit
complaint when it learned that IID claimed ownership of the Highland Terrace Property.
Although the cases that have discussed the issue of the need to amend arise in the context of claims
that arose after the initial complaint was filed, the analysis is equally applicable to claims of which
the plaintiff was unaware at the time the complaint was filed.
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In Spiegel v. Continental Illinois National Bank. 790 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1986), plaintiff
brought an action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").
During the time that the case was pending, counsel for the defendants sent two letters to plaintiff's
counsel that plaintiff believed were fraudulent. Four months after the last of those letters were
received, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim because the
plaintiff had failed to allege two or more examples of racketeering activity. Thereafter, the
plaintiff filed a new action alleging that the two letters sent to plaintiff constituted mail fraud and
therefore supported a new claim under RICO. In rejecting the defendant's claim that the district
court should have dismissed the new RICO action as barred by res judicata, the Seventh Circuit
stated:
In view of the fact that the two newly-alleged predicate acts of mail fraud occurred
after the filing of Spiegel I [the first action], we agree with the district court's
ruling that "the doctrine of res judicata does not bar Spiegel II to the extent it is
based on acts which occurred after Spiegel I was filed."
790 F.2d at 646 (citation omitted).
The same result should govern the issue of whether the adverse possession claim should
have been brought in the Soldier Summit case. American Estate should not be required to amend
to include claims that it did not know about when it filed its original action.
III.

CONCLUSION
Neither prong of res judicata can apply to American Estate's adverse possession claim

because Judge Iwasaki specifically denied summary judgment of the claims against IID for breach
and specific performance of the Separation Agreement. Even if a res judicata analysis were
appropriate, the adverse possession claim would be barred only if it met the requirements of issue
preclusion. IID concedes that it cannot make that showing. Finally, even if the court were to
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apply a claim preclusion analysis, the adverse possession claim is not barred because it should not
have been brought in the Soldier Summit litigation.
Based on the foregoing, American Estate respectfully requests that the order of the district
dismissing this action be reversed and the case be remanded for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _^__ day of February, 1999.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

RohaUd G. Russell,
Attorneys for Appellant and
Plaintiff, American Estates
Management Corporation
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